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BARGAINING IN COMMITTEES OF 
REPRESENTATIVES: THE OPTIMAL VOTING RULE 
 





Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized 
groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which 
specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question 
of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups 
that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this 
problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which 
negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of 
unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any 
winning coalition can enforce an agreement. 
 




Committees are often made up of representatives of diﬀerent-sized groups of individuals,
and make decisions by means of a voting rule (often a weighted majority rule, but more
generally any arbitrary voting rule) which speciﬁes what vote conﬁgurations can pass
a decision. Examples of committees of representatives of this type are provided by the
councils ruling diﬀerent kinds of organizations, including important political examples such
as the Council of Ministers in the EU. This raises the question of the ’fair’, ’optimal’ or
most adequate voting rule, given the diﬀerent sizes of the groups that members represent, if
a principle of equal representation is to be implemented. This issue has been approached so
far by diﬀerent authors by modelling the decision-making process as an idealized two-stage
process, and assessing the ’decisiveness’ (i.e., the probability of being crucial or pivotal) in
making a decision that can be imputed to each individual in the diﬀerent groups assuming
that each representative follows the majority opinion in his/her ’constituency’. This allows
for an assessment of the ’fairness’ of the voting rule of the committee (see, e.g., Penrose
(1946), Owen (1975), Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (1998))1.
Based either on the assessment of the likelihood of being ’decisive’ or of being ’satisﬁed’
or ’successful’ (Rae (1969), Brams and Lake (1978), Barry (1980), Straﬃn, Davis, and
Brams (1981), see also Laruelle and Valenciano (2005a), and, in a diﬀerent framework,
Barber` a and Jackson (2004)), this approach makes sense in the case of a ’take-it-or-leave-
it’ committee. That is, a committee only entitled to accept or reject proposals submitted
to it by some external agency.
In this paper we take a new departure to address the question of the optimal voting rule
in a committee of representatives. We assume that the committee is a bargaining scenario
in which negotiations take place ’in the shadow of’ a voting rule. In the cooperative
game theoretic literature on bargaining since Nash’s (1950) seminal paper, bargaining is
supposed ’by deﬁnition’ to be a process that can be settled only by unanimity. Asymmetry
between players’ bargaining powers can only arise from the bargaining environment. In
many contexts it is often the case in a committee which uses a (possibly nonsymmetric)
voting rule to make decisions that the ﬁnal vote is merely the formal settlement of a
bargaining process in which the issue to be voted upon has been adjusted to gain the
acceptance of all members. We base our approach on Laruelle and Valenciano (2005b),
where the following question is addressed: What agreements can a rational agent expect
to arise when faced with the prospect of engaging in such a situation? That is, when a
general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce a (possibly non
unanimous) agreement. Based on this answer, and assuming that a principle of equal
1See Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) for a critique of this approach.
1representation is to be implemented, here we answer this question: What is the optimal
voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives of diﬀerent-sized groups?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some basic no-
tation and brieﬂy review the theoretical results that are required. In Section 3 we address
the issue of the optimal voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives. Section
4 examines some related work. Section 5 concludes by recapitulating the foundations of
the recommendation implicit in the main result of the paper and pointing out some of its
limitations and the main lines of further research.
2 a bargaining committee
The ﬁrst element in a bargaining committee i st h ev o t i n gr u l e .T h es e tN = {1,...,n} labels
the seats on the committee. As only yes/no voting is considered, a vote conﬁguration can
be represented by the set of ’yes’-voters. So, any S ⊆ N represents the result of a vote in
which only the members of the committee occupying seats in S voted ’yes’. An N-voting
rule is speciﬁed by a set W ⊆ 2N of winning (i.e., which would lead to passing a decision)
vote conﬁgurations such that (i) N ∈ W;( i i )∅ / ∈ W; (iii) If S ∈ W,t h e nT ∈ W for any T
containing S;a n d( i v )I fS ∈ W then N\S/ ∈ W. W denotes the set of all such N-voting
rules.
The n members or players of a committee which uses an N-voting rule are labelled by
the seats in N that they occupy, and we refer to the subset of players denoted by S ⊆ N as
coalition S. We assume that a committee of n (N-labelled) members makes decisions by
means of an N-voting rule W in the following sense. They can reach any alternative within
as e tA, as well as any lottery over them, as long as: (i) a winning coalition supports it, and
(ii) no player is imposed upon an agreement worse than the status quo, where all players
will remain if no winning coalition supports any agreement. It is also assumed that every
player has expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) (vNM) preferences, so
that the relevant information concerning the players’ preferences can be encoded ` al aN a s h
in utility terms by a feasible set of utility vectors D ⊆ RN, together with the particular
vector d ∈ D associated with the disagreement or status quo.T h u s ,t h ep a i r ( D,d)i sa
summary of the situation concerning the players’ decision.
Accepting this simpliﬁcation, the whole situation can be summarized by a pair (B,W),
where B =( D,d) is a classical n-person bargaining problem that represents the conﬁgu-
ration of preferences in the committee, and W is the N-voting rule to enforce agreements.
Thus, consistently with the interpretation that accompanied its introduction, any pair
(B,W) ∈ B×Wwill be referred to as an N-bargaining committee (B,W)2.
2Classical bargaining problems and simple transferable utility (TU) games can be seen as particular
2What conditions can be imposed on a map Φ : B×W→ RN for vector Φ(B,W) ∈ RN
to be considered as a reasonable expectation of utility levels of a general agreement in a
bargaining committee (B,W)? Reasonable prerequisites, if B =( D,d), are: Φ(B,W) ∈ D
(feasibility), and Φ(B,W) ≥ d (individual rationality). In addition to these, in Laruelle
and Valenciano (2005b) the following conditions, the result of adapting to this setting
some conditions from Nash (1950) and Shapley (1953), are required: Eﬃciency (Eﬀ),
Anonymity (An), Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Invariance w.r.t. positive
aﬃne transformations (IAT), Null player (NP). Assuming standard conditions on B,w e
have the following generalization of Nash’s characterization.
Theorem 1 (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2005b) Let Φ : B×W→ RN be a solution that
satisﬁes Eﬀ,A n ,I I A ,I A Ta n dN P ,t h e n
Φ(B,W)=Nashϕ(W)(B), (1)
for some ϕ : W → RN that satisﬁes eﬃciency, anonymity and null player.
Where Nashw(B) denotes the w-weighted asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Kalai,
1977) of an n-person (pure) bargaining problem B =( D,d), for a vector of nonnegative






j∈J(xj − dj)wj if i ∈ J,
di if i ∈ N \ J,
with J = {i ∈ N : wi > 0}. The ’weights’ are usually interpreted as the ’bargaining power’
of the players (see, e.g., Binmore (1998, 2005)). Classical Nash’s (1950) solution to the
bargaining problem corresponds to the case of equal weight for all players. That is,
Nash(B)=a r g i maxx∈Dd
Y
j∈J
(xj − dj). (2)
Therefore, any map ϕ : W → RN that satisﬁes eﬃciency, anonymity and null player
would ﬁti n t of o r m u l a( 1 )a n dy i e l das o l u t i o nΦ(B,W)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the ﬁve rationality
conditions. Although the main conclusions of this paper are presented in section 3 for any
such map ϕ, a special case is worth distinguishing. By adding the condition of Transfer
(T) (Dubey, 1975) the same authors prove the following:
Theorem 2 (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2005b) There exists a unique solution/value Φ :
B×W→ RN that satisﬁes Eﬀ,A n ,I I A ,I A T ,N Pa n dT ,a n di ti sg i v e nb y
Φ(B,W)=NashSh(W)(B). (3)
c a s e so ft h i sm o d e l . T h en-person classical bargaining problem corresponds to the case of a committee
bargaining under the unanimity rule, that is W = {N}.





(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n!
.
Formulae (1) and (3) have a clear interpretation. As Binmore points out, the asym-
metric Nash solutions can be justiﬁed as reﬂecting the diﬀerent ’bargaining power’ of the
players ”determined by the strategic advantages conferred on players by the circumstances
under which they bargain” (1998, p. 78). In the case of this model of a bargaining commit-
tee the voting rule, possibly nonsymmetric, is the only source of diﬀerences in ’strategic
advantages’. Thus, according to formulae (1) and (3), under the conditions assumed in
either case, either vector ϕ(W)o rSh(W) gives the ’bargaining power’ that the voting rule
confers to each member of the committee.
3 a bargaining committee of representatives
Assume that each member i of a committee of n members, labelled by N,r e p r e s e n t s
ag r o u pMi of size mi. If these groups are disjoint and M = ∪i∈NMi, the cardinal of
M is m =
P
i∈N mi. Let us denote by M the partition M = {M1,M 2,..,M n}.A n d
assume that it is a bargaining committee in the sense considered in the previous section.
It seems clear that if the diﬀerent groups are of diﬀerent sizes a symmetric voting rule
is not adequate for such committee, at least if a principle of equal representation is to
be implemented. This raises the issue of the choice of the ’most adequate’ voting rule
under these conditions. The ﬁrst and main job towards providing an answer is a precise
speciﬁcation of what is meant by ’adequate’, ’fair’, ’right’, or, the term we have chosen
here, ’optimal’. ’Optimal’ in what sense and from which or whose point of view? The
basic idea, which we further specify presently, is this: a voting rule is ’optimal’ if any
individual of any group is indiﬀerent between bargaining directly and leaving it in the
hands of a representative. Utopian as it may sound (and as it is in general), we will show
that this is implementable if a certain level of symmetry (not uniformity!) of preferences
within every group is assumed.
In general a bargaining committee of representatives will negotiate diﬀerent issues
over time under the same voting rule. In every case, depending on the particular issue,
ad i ﬀerent conﬁguration of preferences will emerge in the population represented by the
members of the committee. Thus it does not make sense to make the ’optimal’ voting
rule dependent on the preference proﬁle, nor does it make sense to assume unanimous
preferences within every constituency. On the other hand, if there is no relationship at all
between the preferences of the members within each group it is not clear on what normative
4grounds to found the choice of a voting rule for the committee of representatives. In order
to found an answer we assume that the conﬁguration of preferences in the population
represented is symmetric within each group in the following sense.
Assume that B =( D,d)( d ∈ D ⊆ RM)i st h em-person bargaining problem represent-
ing the conﬁguration of preferences of the m individuals in M. We say that a permutation
π : M → M respects M if for all i ∈ N, π(Mi)=Mi. We say that B is M-symmetric if
for any permutation π : M → M that respects M,i th o l d sπd = d,a n df o ra l lx ∈ D,
πx ∈ D. In words, B is M-symmetric if for any group (Mi) the disagreement payoﬀ is
the same for all its members (dk = dl, for all k,l ∈ Mi), and ﬁxing in any way the payoﬀs
of the other players in M\Mi, the set of feasible payoﬀs for the players in that group
(Mi) is symmetric3. Notice that this does not mean at all that all players within each
group have the same preferences. In fact it includes all symmetric situations ranging from
unanimous preferences to the ’zero-sum’ case of strict competition within each group. But
note that if the payoﬀs of all the players in M\Mi are ﬁxed, the outcome of bargaining
within Mi (under unanimity and assuming anonymity) would yield the same utility level
for all players in Mi.T h u sM-symmetry in B entails the following consequences.
Let M, N,a n dM,a sa b o v e ,a n dl e tB =( D,d)a nM-symmetric M-conﬁguration of
preferences. Assuming (as a term of reference) the players in M negotiate directly under
unanimity, according to Nash’s bargaining model, the outcome would be Nash(B). On
the other hand, as B is M-symmetric, it must be
Nashk(B)=Nashl(B)( ∀i ∈ N,∀k,l ∈ Mi).
Namely, in each group all players would receive the same payoﬀ a c c o r d i n gt oN a s h ’ s
bargaining solution. Therefore the optimal solution of the maximization problem (2) that
yields Nash(B) coincides with the optimal solution of the same maximization problem
when the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors is constrained to yield the same payoﬀ for any two




(x1,...,x n) ∈ RN :( x1,..,x 1, ...... ,xn,..,x n) ∈ D},
m1−times mn−times
and by dN the vector in RN whose i-component is, for each i ∈ N, equal to dk (the same
for all k ∈ Mi). Namely, BN is the bargaining problem that would result by taking one
individual from each constituency as representative for bargaining on behalf of it, under
the commitment of later bargaining symmetrically within that constituency after the level
3This is equivalent to saying in Chae and Heidhues’ (2004) terms that all groups are homogeneous.
5of utility of the other constituencies has been settled. We have that, for all i ∈ N and
all k ∈ Mi,








(xj − dj)mj = Nash¯ m
i (BN). (4)
where ¯ m =( m1,...,m n). That is to say, for the conﬁguration of preferences or M-
bargaining problem B,ap l a y e rk in M would obtain the same utility level by direct
(m-player unanimous) bargaining, as a representative would obtain by bargaining on be-
half of him/her (and of all the players in the same group) under the conﬁguration of pref-
erences BN if each representative were endowed with a bargaining power proportional to
t h es i z eo ft h eg r o u p .The problem then is how to ’implement’ a weighted Nash bargaining
solution. In other words and more precisely, how to implement a bargaining environment
that confers the right bargaining p o w e rt oe a c hr e p r e s e n t a t i v e 4.
In view of Theorem 1, if a ’power index’ (i.e., an eﬃcient, anonymous and ignoring
null players map ϕ : W → RN) is considered the right assessment of bargaining power,







then this rule would exactly implement such environment. In particular, if the index is the







Then, interpreting the term ’bargaining power’ in the precise game-theoretic sense
formerly speciﬁed, the above discussion can be summarized in the following
Theorem 3 The optimal voting rule in a bargaining committee of representatives is one
that gives each member a bargaining power proportional to the size of the group he/she
represents.
From the point of view of applications there are still some issues. There is the question
of the ’right’ power index (i.e., the right ϕ(W)) for assessing the bargaining power that
the voting rule confers to each member of the committee. This issue is not settled but,
as Laruelle and Valenciano (2005b) point out, this would require additional assumptions
4Here we use the term ’implementation’ in a general sense, and not in the standard technical sense of
providing a noncooperative game that yields the desired outcome as an equilibrium.
6about the bargaining protocol in the committee, and possibly a noncooperative analysis.
Also, in general, whatever the ϕ, no rule will yield exactly the required bargaining weights.
Thus there is the technical problem of ﬁnding the voting rule closest to optimality5.T h e r e
may also be a problem of multiplicity. For instance, if all the groups are of equal size any
symmetric voting rule would be optimal according to Theorem 3. In a case such as this
there is at least a second point of view to reﬁne the choice: The ease of decision-making
(Coleman (1971), Felsenthal and Machover (1998)).
In spite of these practical problems, we think it is worth stressing the clear message of
Theorem 3, consistent with intuition and diﬀerent from previous recommendations.
4 related work
The answer provided by Theorem 3 to the optimal voting rule issue is a completely new
departure from previous ones, but it is worth noting the formal similarity with some of
them. First, with the naive proposal of a weighted majority rule with weights propor-
tional to the size of the groups, which has long been criticized but is sometimes still used6.
Also, in the ’take-it-or-leave-it’ scenario, the two-stage idealization yields the ’square root’
rule, which solves the normative problem of the fair distribution of ’decisiveness’ in such a
committee, assuming that each representative follows the majoritarian opinion in his/her
constituency (see, e.g., Penrose (1946), Owen (1975), Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998), Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998)). That is, assuming the group sizes’ are big enough, the ’fair’
rule is the one for which the Banzhaf (1965) index of each representative is proportional
to the square root of the size of the group he/she represents. Curiously enough, in a some-
what inconsistent way, some US courts have accepted the Banzhaf index as a measure of
the voting power of the members in a committee, but approved a voting system that made
the Banzhaf index of each representative proportional to his/her district’s size (Benoit and
Kornhauser, 2002). Note also that unlike the traditional a priori voting power approach
the voters’ preferences are a crucial ingredient in the model considered here.
On the other hand, the case in which bargaining among groups occurs has often been
considered in economic literature since Harsanyi (1977)7. In Harsanyi (1977), where Nash
5Whatever the size of the committee the number of voting rules is ﬁnite, while the set of possible
combinations of group sizes is not. A similar problem occurs for the ’square root rule’ that solves the
normative problem of the fair distribution of decisiveness in a ’take-it-or-leave-it’ committee as commented
in the the next section.
6See Benoit and Kornhauser (2002, pp. 2252-2259) for an interesting account of the diﬀerent criteria
endorsed by U.S. courts on the issue of ”fair and eﬀective representation.”
7See footnote 1 in Chae and Heidhues (2004) for an interesting quantiﬁc a t i o nb a s e do nt w ol e a d i n g
journals. Usually for two-party negotiations, under diﬀerent frameworks and with diﬀerent goals, several
7classical bargaining solution is extended to n players, the following ’joint-bargaining para-
dox’ is discussed (cf. 10.7, pp. 203-211). Consider the three-person TU-like bargaining
game B in which the set of feasible payoﬀsi sd e ﬁned by the inequalities u1+u2+u3 ≤ 30,
and the disagreement payoﬀ vector is (0,0,0). If the three players bargain as diﬀerent in-
dependent agents according to Nash’s bargaining model, the solution will be (10,10,10).
”But suppose players 2 and 3 decide to act as one player and agree that they will split
equally the joint payoﬀ that they obtain this way. Then the game will become a two-
person game between coalition {2,3} and player 1. Hence each side will obtain a payoﬀ
u1 = u23 =1 5 .I fp l a y e r s2 and 3 l a t e rs p l i tt h e i rj o i n tp a y o ﬀ u23,t h e nt h eﬁnal outcome
will become (15,7.5,7.5). Consequently the fact that players 2 and 3 have joined forces has
actually decreased their payoﬀsf r o m1 0t o7 . 5 ”(Harsanyi, 1977, p. 203). He solves the
paradox by analyzing the situation by means of Zeuthen’s (1930) Principle, and oﬀering
two explanations. In both cases the explanation shows the ”weakening of the bargaining
position” of the player acting on behalf of the two-player coalition. Moreover, he points out
that: ”any possible solution concept will show this behavior if it satisﬁes the symmetry and
the joint-eﬃciency postulates.” But this is the critical point: symmetry (like anonymity)
in the classical setting ignores the possibility of bargaining under asymmetric conditions,
or under rules diﬀerent from unanimity. In fact, the origin of the paradox is admitting
for a moment that by bargaining as a single player ”players 2 and 3 have joined forces.”
This contradicts common sense views in real-world situations actually, where committees
of representatives whose members represent groups of diﬀerent sizes rarely bargain under
unanimity. They often use nonsymmetric voting rules (even if usually chosen on no clear
grounds) to bargain under. As Harsanyi put it in somewhat tautological terms: ”If two
or more players form a coalition for bargaining purposes, this will tend to strengthen their
bargaining position if this organizational change strengthens their determination to obtain
better terms and weakens their reluctance to risk a conﬂict.” This is exactly what an
optimal rule would implement, compensating the loss behind Harsanyi’s paradox in terms
of bargaining power.
It is also interesting to examine some recent work concerning ’group bargaining’. In two
recent papers Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Chae and Moulin (2004) address this problem
from an axiomatic point of view. Their model consists of a classical bargaining problem
plus a partition of the set of players into subsets that represent the bargaining groups. Chae
and Heidhues (2004) characterize axiomatically a ’group bargaining solution’ for situations
where diﬀerent groups bargain with each other. It is an extension of Nash’s solution to
noncooperative models have been provided (see, for instance, Jun (1989), Perry and Samuelson (1994),
Haller and Holden (1997), and Cai (2000)).
8the bargaining problem within as well as across groups. They impose a condition of
’Representation of Homogeneous Groups’, whose interpretation is the following. Every
member of a homogeneous group obtains what he would obtain if he alone bargained on
behalf of the group. They show that by adding this condition to Nash’s axioms a unique
solution is characterized. Namely, the asymmetric Nash solution in which the weight of
every representative is the reciprocal of the size of the group he belongs to.T h a t i s , t h e
reciprocal of what our Theorem 3 prescribes! The explanation is easy. They impose
the indiﬀerence for any player between bargaining (under unanimity) directly or as a
representative. But this can only be achieved by ’penalizing’ representatives proportionally
to the size of the group they represent. Again this is the eﬀect of taking symmetric
bargaining-under-unanimity as the only conceivable way of bargaining.
In Chae and Moulin (2004) the family of asymmetric Nash solutions where the bar-
gaining power of an agent in a group of size mi is mα
i ,w i t hα ≥− 1, is characterized ax-
iomatically. As they point out: ”One benchmark of the family Fα is the group-insensitive
solution F1: this solution is the ordinary symmetric Nash bargaining solution, ignoring
the partition altogether”. In other words, these are exactly the weights for which (4) holds,
and this is the solution that an optimal rule would implement8.
Finally there is the relevant work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In particular their
distinction between ’closed’ and ’open’ amendment rules in a legislature, parallels our
distinction between a ’take-it-or-leave-it’ committee and a bargaining committee in a dif-
ferent framework. But their analysis is non cooperative and has a descriptive/predictive
purpose, while here we adopt a normative approach, cooperatively founded, in search of
an answer to the question of the choice of voting rule. On the other hand, their analysis
is constrained to the majority rule, and the case of a transferable utility conﬁguration of
preferences, while we use a more general setting: non necessarily symmetric voting rules,
and non transferable utility preference proﬁles.
5 conclusions
From the point of view of voting power theory and collective decision or ’constitutional’
design, this paper contributes to some clariﬁcation. Namely, an alternative to the tradi-
tional a priori voting power approach to the issue of the optimal voting rule, only adequate
for what we call a ’take-it-or-leave-it’ committee, has been provided. A new approach con-
sistent with the idea of a bargaining committee is the main contribution of this paper.
In real world situations things may most often not be that black-and-white. Often the
8They show how this solution as well as those associated with α>1 are free from the ’joint-bargaining
paradox’.
9same committee acts at some times as a ’take-it-or-leave-it’ committee, and at others as
a bargaining committee. In any case the two clear-cut extreme cases are valuable terms
of reference as benchmarks for more complex ones.
Let us examine critically the meaning and foundations of the normative recommenda-
tion for a pure bargaining committee implicit in Theorem 3 and point out some lines of
further research. The cornerstones of Theorem 3 are, basically, Theorem 1 and a principle
of equal representation implementable under certain conditions on the voters preferences.
On the one hand, the classical Nash bargaining solution can be interpreted in positive
terms as a prediction of the outcome of negotiations among ideally rational players in a
perfectly transparent or complete information environment (e.g., Binmore (2005))9.W h i l e
such an interpretation may be plausible for the case of two bargainers, it is not that cred-
ible for a larger number. In some cases a committee represents thousands or even millions
of individuals (consider, e.g., the Council of Ministers of the EU). In such cases ’direct
bargaining’ is unthinkable in practical terms, but the Nash solution can still be used as
an ideal term of reference for normative purposes. The same applies to its extension given
by Theorem 1, which is at the base of Theorem 3. Theorem 1 is supported by rather
general ’axioms’ interpretable as ideal rationality conditions in a complete information
environment in the same spirit as Nash’s seminal paper.
No doubt it would be desirable to complement the cooperative/axiomatic foundation
with a non cooperative analysis. As Binmore, (2005) puts it: ”Cooperative game the-
ory sometimes provides simple characterizations of what agreement rational players will
reach.” This is exactly what Theorem 1 provides for the situation speciﬁed. But this is
not the end of the story. As the second part of the sentence just quoted goes ”but we
need noncooperative game theory to understand why.” This points out the main line for
further research. In fact Theorem 1 (and as a consequence Theorem 3) does not provide
a single answer to the question raised. But we see no drawback here. It is our conjecture
that a non cooperative model of a bargaining committee will support the results given by
Theorems 1 and 3, and account for the diﬀerent answers implicit in both depending on
the speciﬁcation of the bargaining protocol. In particular we expect the particular answer
associated with the Shapley-Shubik index and Theorem 2 to appear as a special case with
at the least one ’focal point’ character within a range of bargaining protocols.
At the foundations of Theorem 3 an egalitarian principle of equal representation has
also been assumed. This justiﬁes the desideratum of a voting rule for the committee such
that all people represented see as indiﬀerent direct bargaining (ideal and unfeasible) and
9Some authors (e.g., Mariotti, 1999, 2000), favor a normative interpretation of Nash’s bargaining
solution.
10leaving it in the hands of a committee of representatives. This in general is obviously
utopian, but it has been proved implementable at least under some ideal symmetry con-
ditions. In real world situations this condition may well fail to occur in most cases. Only
in the ideal case of M-symmetry is the principle of equal representation suﬃcient to de-
termine an answer. But this idealization seems a reasonable term of reference if a voting
rule is to be chosen10.
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